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Wesleyan Theology and Moral Psychology:
Precedents for Continuing Engagement
Randy L. Maddox
The last two decades have witnessed vigorous growth in study of the
interchange between science and religion. An important dimension of this
recent work is historical scholarship discrediting some popular caricatures
(dating from the late nineteenth century) of Christianity as anti-science.
This scholarship has dispelled many myths and demonstrated that there has
been regular, typically constructive, interaction between theology and study
of the natural world through the history of the church.1
In a book focused on the nexus of Wesleyan theology and the social
sciences, it is fitting to begin with a reminder that John Wesley is an
example of such engagement with current studies of the natural world.2 His
five-volume Survey of the Wisdom of God covered the range of the natural
sciences. Part of Wesley’s interest was his commitment to providing
medical advice to the poor.3 Another clear interest was to highlight the
integral connection of humanity with the larger creation, and our
accountability for that connection.4 But no area of current study of human
nature interested Wesley more than efforts to explain the dynamics of
choice and action—what is often called “moral psychology.” Central to this
area of concern are questions like: What impels or inclines a person to
initiate and sustain certain actions? Could that person have chosen to act
differently? What might enable a person to cease undesirable behavior, or
“free” that person to engage in more desirable behavior?
Alternative possible answers to such questions have clear
implications for any model of Christian life. The first section of this essay
will trace Wesley’s dialogue with alternatives being championed in his day, 
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highlighting how he drew on moral psychology to articulate and defend his
convictions about “holiness of heart and life,” nurtured in the “means of
grace.” The second section will consider how shifting assumptions about
moral psychology among Wesley’s nineteenth-century heirs made it
difficult to maintain Wesley’s convictions. The final section will sketch
Wesleyan interaction with developments in psychology in the twentieth
century.5
The Centrality of Wesley’s “Affectional” Moral Psychology to his
Model of Christian Life
The question which framed the whole of John Wesley’s spiritual
journey was: “How can I be the kind of person that God created me to be,
and that I long to be, a person holy in heart and life?” In his early years, a
morally earnest Wesley focused on our responsibility to strive for holiness
of heart and life. In his spiritual renewal around 1738 Wesley appropriated
more deeply a recognition of the priority of God’s gracious acceptance to
any response on our part in the Christian life. This initially stood in some
tension with his emphasis on our moral rectitude. However, Wesley
eventually wove his deepened conviction of the graciousness of salvation
into his long-standing conviction of the importance of holiness in heart and
life. Significantly, he drew upon a recent alternative emphasis in moral
psychology to form this mature perspective.
The leading Anglican voices at the beginning of the eighteenth
century assumed a moral psychology with roots running back to Plato.
Plato’s central emphases were appropriated early in Christian spirituality.
The resulting model emphasized our ability to reason as what provides
humans with some capacity for self-determination. By contrast, it identified
the greatest obstacle to moral rectitude as the passional dimension of human
life—those emotional reactions, instincts, and the like that are not a product
of rational initiative or under fully conscious control. The normative
corollary was that moral choice and action required bringing this passional
dimension under rational control. This is admittedly not an easy task, but
the central stream of this Christian tradition has assumed that, through
regular practice (empowered by grace), we can habituate an increased
aptitude at maintaining moral rectitude. Wesley was nurtured in this
habituated rational control model of moral psychology and it is reflected in
his early prescriptions for the spiritual life.
While this Platonic model was widely valued in eighteenth-century
Anglicanism (in significant part because of its defense of self-
determination), there were alternative voices that branded its stress on 
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duty, rational control, and habit formation as “Pelagian.” This judgment
echoed the challenge that St. Augustine had raised to appropriations of
Plato in the early church. In his spiritual pilgrimage Augustine had
struggled and failed to gain habituated rational control over his passions. He
drew two conclusions from this failure: 1) that such attempts trust in
ineffective human efforts rather than in divine gracious intervention; and 2)
that reason is more the slave than the master of the passions. The alternative
moral psychology that he developed remains one of the clearest examples of
deterministic moral psychology in Christian thought. Augustine argued that
moral choices and actions flow from our ruling affections; reason cannot
thwart this flow, and there is no other source of volition. As a result of the
fall, all humans are born with bent affections that give rise to sinful actions.
Nothing we attempt in our own power can successfully suppress or remove
these bent affections. However, in regeneration God graciously
implants—in the elect—new affections that naturally manifest themselves
in holy living (to the degree allowed within the constraints of our present
conflicted situation).
Wesley’s deeper encounter with this Augustinian stream of
Christian spirituality (via the English Moravians) in 1738, at the climax of a
period of his own spiritual struggle, sensitized him to the subtle tendency of
preoccupation with human habit formation to eclipse the conviction of
God’s gracious prevenience in salvation. The encounter also reenforced his
growing doubts about the ability of rational conviction alone to effectuate
human action. But Wesley could not accept Augustine’s deterministic
conclusions, and he quickly became suspicious of the quietist tendencies in
Moravian spirituality.
Wesley’s way forward proved to be paved by his embrace of the
empiricist swing in eighteenth-century British philosophy. Wesley was
exposed to the growing stream of empiricist moral thought during his
Oxford years. In contrast to the Platonic model which had dominated prior
Anglican theology, this stream argued that while reason can clarify the
conditions and consequences of a proposed course of action it was not
capable of effecting our engagement in that action. On analogy with
empiricist claims in epistemology, they insisted that humans are moved to
action only as we are experientially affected. To put it in a practical
example: rational persuasion of the rightness of loving others is not
sufficient of itself to move us to do so; we are ultimately inclined and
enabled to love others only as we experience being loved ourselves. To
drive this point home, empiricist moral thought redefined the human “will.”
They criticized prior moral psychologies for either reducing the will to
being a mere cipher for intellectual conviction, or assuming it was 
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an innate store of power for spontaneous acts of volition. They argued that
the will is instead properly equated with the set of affections that all humans
possess, and that these affections are best understood as responsive in
nature. The affections are not self-generating springs of motive power, they
incite us to action only when they are first affected.
Wesley’s writings after 1738 embrace this affectional moral
psychology. This is evident in his typical list of the faculties that constitute
the Image of God in humanity: understanding, will, liberty, and conscience.
Wesley stressed that “will” in this list was an inclusive term for the various
affections. These affections are not simply feelings, they are the
indispensable motivating inclinations behind human action. In ideal
expression they integrate the rational and emotional dimensions of human
life into holistic inclinations toward action (like love). While provocative of
human action, the affections have a crucial receptive dimension as well.
They are not self-causative, but are awakened and thrive in response to
experience of external reality. In what Wesley now held as the crucial
instance, it is only in response to our experience of God’s gracious love for
us, shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, that our affection of love
for God and others is awakened and grows.
This grounding of moral volition in responsive holistic affections
shares similarities with Augustine. It also calls to mind empiricists like
David Hume who presented the influence of our passions upon our actions
as invincible, thereby undermining human freedom. Wesley could not
accept such deterministic implications. He judged them to be contrary to
our experience, reason, the Christian tradition, and the teachings of
Scripture. This led him to distinguish carefully among our human capacities
between the “will” and “liberty.” While the will responsively inclines us to
various actions, liberty is our— limited, but real— capacity to allow or
refuse the enactment of any particular inclination. Though we cannot self-
generate love, we do have the liberty to stifle responsive loving or let it
flow! This insistence distanced Wesley’s mature moral psychology from
both philosophical and theological forms of strong determinism.
But how did Wesley’s mature view differ from the quietistic
tendencies of the Moravians (who rejected all attempts to “coax” proper
dispositions, favoring “spontaneous” expression)? On this point we need to
appreciate Wesley’s language of moral “tempers.” He drew on a common
eighteenth-century sense of this word to affirm that our affections need not
be simply transitory, they can be focused and strengthened into enduring
dispositions. The capacity for simple responsive love is an affection; an
enduring disposition to love is a (holy) temper. The crucial point is that, for
the mature Wesley, God does not typically infuse holy tempers
instantaneously. 
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Rather, God’s regenerating grace awakens in believers the “seeds” of such
virtues. These seeds then strengthen and take shape as we “grow in grace.”
Given liberty, this growth involves our responsible cooperation, for we
could instead neglect or stifle God’s gracious empowerment.
With this sketch of Wesley’s mature affectional moral psychology in
mind we can consider how integral it was to his endorsement of Christian
perfection and his emphasis on the means of grace in the pursuit of this
goal. This is signaled by the centrality of the tempers to his understanding
of both sin and holiness. In the case of sin, he insisted that the issue was
more than individual actions. He frequently discussed sin in terms of a
threefold division: sinful nature or tempers, sinful words, and sinful actions.
The point of this division was that sinful actions and words flow from
corrupted tempers, so the problem of sin must ultimately be addressed at
this affectional level. Correspondingly, Wesley’s typical definition of
Christian life placed primary emphasis on this inward dimension, or the
renewal of our “heart.” This renewal involves both the enlivening of our
affections in response to the affect of God’s graciously communicated
loving Presence and the tempering of these affections into holy dispositions.
Since holiness of thought, word, and action would flow from such renewal,
Wesley could identify the essential goal of all true religion as the recovery
of holy tempers.
This makes the means of grace central to true religion as well, since
Wesley frequently warned his followers of the folly of seeking the end of
holy tempers apart from the means that God has graciously provided.
Wesley valued the means of grace both as avenues through which God
conveys the gracious Presence that enables our responsive growth in
holiness and as exercises by which we responsibly nurture that holiness.
How close did Wesley hope we could come, through responsive
participation in the means of grace, to the end of recovered holy tempers in
this life? He is well-known for the claim that entire sanctification is a
present possibility for Christians. The place to begin unpacking this claim is
to stress that entire sanctification (or Christian Perfection) is not an isolated
reality for Wesley. It is a dynamic level of maturity within the larger
process of sanctification, the level characteristic of adult Christian life.
Since he considered love to be the essence of Christian life, he could define
Christian Perfection as “the humble, gentle, patient love of God, and our
neighbor, ruling our tempers, words, and actions.”6 God’s love is shed
abroad in the lives of all Christians, awakening their responsive love for
God and others. But this love is often weak, sporadic, and contested by
contrary affections in new believers. In the lives of the entirely sanctified it
is strengthened and patterned to the point that it provides stable 
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character.
Such character would express itself in actions. For example, acts of
love would typically flow from a temper of love. Yet, Wesley also
recognized that ignorance, mistakes, and other human frailties often distort
the passage from tempers (formed affections) to action. It was in this sense
that he tired of the debate over whether Christian Perfection was “sinless.”
He did indeed believe that it consisted in holy tempers, but not that it was
characterized by infallible expression of those tempers in actions.
Perhaps the best way to capture Wesley’s affectional view of entire
sanctification is to say he was convinced that the Christian life did not have
to remain a life of perpetual struggle. He believed that Christians should
aspire to take on the disposition of Christ, and live out that disposition
within the constraints of our human infirmities. To deny this possibility
would be to deny the sufficiency of God’s empowering—making the power
of sin greater than that of grace.
Nineteenth-Century Methodist Shift in Moral Psychology, and Its
Impact
The more one appreciates how Wesley’s conception of holiness of
heart and life was framed by his mature moral psychology, the easier it is to
understand how difficult it might be to maintain this conception if one
modified his psychological model. This is exactly the situation in which
Wesley’s theological descendants rapidly placed themselves, particularly in
North America. By the beginning of the nineteenth century an affectional
moral psychology had come to be equated in popular culture with
determinism, due to the broad influence of the forms of this psychology
championed by Hume and Jonathan Edwards. As a result, Wesley’s heirs
found it hard to recognize his moral psychology, let alone defend it. The
aversion to determinism that they inherited from him ironically led them to
rally instead behind those who were defending our capacity for rational
choice as what “frees” us to rise above and control all influences that would
otherwise determine human choice and action.
Many of Wesley’s nineteenth-century heirs were drawn to a
decisionistic reframing of rational-control emphases (via Thomas Reid and
Immanuel Kant) that was rapidly pervading North Atlantic culture. On this
model, the “will” becomes our innate ability at any given point to assert
rational control over various motivating dynamics, thereby freeing
ourselves to make moral choices. Emotional or affectional motivating
dynamics are assumed to be blind (arational), hence technically amoral.7
Likewise habits and inclinations are judged to have moral status only when
voluntarily 
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embraced, and often considered to be more an obstacle to than a facilitator
of intentional moral decisions to act.
Adopting such differing emphases from Wesley’s moral psychology
was bound to impact the reception of his correlated conviction that true
holiness of heart and life is achievable in this life through the nurture of a
holistic set of means of grace. Indeed, it set off a debate among nineteenth-
century Methodists in which revisions of Wesley’s precedent crept in on all
sides.
The greatest revisions were by those who stressed most the
decisionistic aspect of the dominant modern moral psychology. Within
decisionistic models a “virtuous” person is not one who has nurtured
inclinations towards desired moral behavior but one who heroically rises
above all inclinations in an autonomous moral act. Moreover, this validation
applies only to that act and must be won anew with each subsequent
decision. On such terms, it is no wonder that prominent voices in
nineteenth-century Methodism characterized “perfect” holiness as simply
an ideal to be endlessly pursued—being achieved, at best, on sporadic and
fleeting occasions.
Understandably, other Methodists judged this a betrayal of Wesley
and sought a way to affirm enduring Christian Perfection within the
dynamics of their revised moral psychology. Some simply insisted that
expectation of a consistent series of autonomous virtuous decisions is not so
unrealistic, given our regeneration by the Spirit. But this alternative tended
to consolidate God’s gracious transforming work of regeneration to a single
event (the New Birth), setting aside Wesley’s conception of sanctification
as the progressive transformation of unholy inclinations (tempers) into holy
ones. While they recognized that new believers continue to struggle with
inclinations to sinful acts, they accepted the notion that these inclinations
have little moral status. Indeed, such inclinations were considered a
necessary expression of our probationary situation. The true locus of moral
concern, therefore, was not their amelioration but simply the consistent
decisionistic exercise over them of the rational control that was made
possible by our New Birth.
This first way of defending Christian Perfection struck many
Methodists as overly moralistic. While they shared the conviction that
mature Christians should evidence consistency in their moral lives, they did
not believe that it was a realistic expectation of new believers. Rather such
consistency must be developed within the Christian life. This emphasis
moved them closer to Wesley’s model of habituated tempers, but
differences reflecting the rationalist tone of their preferred moral
psychology remained. They tended to conceive of Christian Perfection as 
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the habituated rational control over our lower (affectional) nature that is
developed by repeated practice. The holism of Wesley’s tempers is missing
here, as is the empowering dimension of the means of grace that correlates
to his emphasis on the responsive nature of affections. This is most evident
in their tendency to restrict emphasis on the means of grace to those means
aimed mainly at exhorting our intellect: sermon, bible study, and prayer.
There was a third major possible way of conceiving Christian
Perfection within the broad rational-control camp of moral
psychology—affirming that Christians can enjoy an enduring spontaneous
rational control over our passions and affections. Since most Christians do
not enter such an enduring state at the New Birth, this option required
clarifying what obstructions still blocked its expression and how they could
be removed. Some nineteenth-century Methodists invoked John Fletcher’s
notion of a post-regeneration “baptism of the Holy Spirit” as this pivotal
event. Like a river bursting its dam, rational control was anticipated to flow
immediately and naturally after this baptism. This stirred up a vigorous
debate over such a “second work of grace.” Many of the other defenders of
the possibility of Christian Perfection charged that this created a spiritual
elitism and lowered the expectation of holy living for “average” Christians.
They also pushed for a specific explanation of what it was that rendered
holiness impossible for the merely regenerate Christian, and how the
baptism of the Holy Spirit resolved this situation.
The explanation that came to define this third way of conceiving
Christian Perfection in nineteenth-century Methodism focused upon
Original Sin. While Wesley most typically called the unholy tempers
remaining in believers “inward sin” or “inbeing sin,” he also used the
traditional language of “Original Sin.” The latter term became standard for
Wesley’s heirs, in designating the distorted inclinations of believers’
affections. But this forced a confrontation with the decisionistic assumption
that inclinations of our affections are morally relevant only to the degree
that they represent the cumulative impact of our individual deliberate
choices (thereby specifically excluding any innate inclinations). A
predictable result of this confrontation was the growing number of
Methodists who abandoned the notion of Original Sin. The more significant
result, for present interests, was the manner in which some chose to defend
the notion. They specifically differentiated Original Sin from any
inclination of our affections; it became a deeper lying inborn “evil
principle,” with distortions in our affections being among its secondary
effects.
The Methodists who pushed this distinction were those most
concerned 
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to champion a model of Christian Perfection as something achieved
instantaneously, subsequent to the New Birth, at the time one receives the
baptism of the Holy Spirit. They made their case by using this revised
conception of Original Sin to account for the spiritual struggles of new
believers. They argued that the true obstacle to holy living is not wrong
inclinations, which might be defused or reshaped, but this deeper lying evil
principle (which they described with such additional names as the “Old
Man” and the “carnal mind”). The clear implication was that neither heroic
volitional resolve nor thorough habituation can bring true freedom for
obedience. The only thing that will suffice is for this principle to be
removed from the believer’s life. And how is this possible? The core of the
final revision was the claim that the baptism of the Holy Spirit—and it
alone—effects this removal. New believers struggling with unholy
inclinations should be encouraged to move on rapidly to receiving this
additional gift of God, not frustrated by counsel about nurturing holy
character. Those who receive this baptism will find rational control over
their passional nature flowing spontaneously (though not irresistibly) from
that point.
This final model became the “classic” understanding of the holiness
wing of Methodism by the end of the nineteenth century. For all of its
differences from the other revisions, it suffered the same fate—those
growing up in mainline Methodist and holiness churches under these
various models increasingly found them inadequate. The models called for a
level of Christian maturity that they did little to empower and nurture,
rendering their call unrealistic. In retrospect it has become clear that their
antipathy to determinism had pushed Wesley’s heirs to conceive of the
“freedom” of the will in a way that failed to value sufficiently the
responsive and formative dimensions of human willing.
Reactions to the Emergence of Modern Psychotherapy & Experimental
Psychology
As doubts about the realism of their (revised) models of Christian
Perfection were piling up in the early twentieth century one might have
expected members of the various Wesleyan traditions to question the
adequacy of their assumed moral psychologies and to search for
alternatives, but developments in the discipline of psychology forestalled
such reconsideration for some time. At the heart of these developments was
the move to transform psychology into a modern science. The first steps in
this direction came with Enlightenment figures like John Locke, who began
to shift attention from debates about what faculties might 
15
account for our experience to simple consideration of our states of
consciousness themselves as empirical data to be analyzed and categorized.
This shift carried within it a recasting of the nature of psychology, moving
from a consciously metaphysical and normative discipline to a purportedly
descriptive and explanatory discipline. This casting was formalized with
Wilhelm Wundt’s opening of the first psychology laboratory in Leipzig in
1879.
Like most other Christian traditions, Methodists were slow to expect
aid from the new scientific approach to psychology in training persons for
“care of souls,” assigning textbooks in psychology that operated out of the
earlier philosophical model well into the 1920s. Meanwhile, those
Methodists who did engage the new approach quickly recognized that the
initial wave of descriptive psychology retained many of the assumptions
that underlay the current reigning moral psychology. Prominent
representatives like John Dewey continued to take at face value the human
sense of a capacity for self-determination and to identify as the mark of
mature character the presence of rational/moral control over the passions, a
control that is developed by an intentional series of decisions. Most of the
revised models of Christian life in nineteenth-century Methodism found
little to object to here. The one clear area of debate focused on the apparent
dismissal of the possible efficacy of a single decisive act of the will.
The typical response of writers in the holiness movement at this
juncture to emphasis by academic psychologists on the scientific evidence
of the positive benefits of habituation was to charge them with offering a
false alternative to the true instantaneous means of establishing the control
of our will over our passions. By contrast, the work of Dewey and other
psychologists was frequently invoked  in the broader Wesleyan movement
as scientific warrant to criticize privileging of dramatic conversion
experiences as the normative pattern for “becoming” a Christian. In a few
cases this critique hardened into suspicion of (or disdain for) all dramatic
conversions. Most moved instead toward the implicit normative conclusion
that William James advanced via his psychological “description” of The
Varieties of Religious Experience (1902)—namely, that we should avoid
standardizing any single way of experiencing religious conversion, because
differing ways will be appropriate to the naturally occurring variety of
human temperaments.
Meanwhile things were changing rapidly in the discipline of
psychology. Major theorists were pushing the discipline beyond mere
description of psychological states, focusing it on the ultimate scientific
goal of explaining human experience and behavior. And in these 
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explanations they now refused to take at face value our sense of being
autonomous rational masters of our behavior. In particular, Sigmund
Freud’s “hermeneutic of suspicion” stressed the role of the unconscious
with its collection of irrational drives and suppressed experiences in
explaining behavior that previous psychologists had usually attributed to
conscious human choice. This marked a reentry into modern psychology of
emphasis on the passional element in human willing, though as formulated
by Freud it carried heavy overtones of determinism. Freud was followed by
a series of deterministic accounts of human action in experimental
psychology that put primary stress on factors other than conscious rational
choice—starting with B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism and continuing into
recent sociobiology and evolutionary psychology.
Paralleling the larger religious community again, the initial reaction
of most Wesleyans to these changing emphases in psychotherapy and
experimental psychology was negative. The dominant philosophical
movement at this time in mainline Methodism was Boston Personalism,
which had defended personal freedom and responsibility against the
deterministic implications of various modern metaphysics. The similar
implications in Freudianism and behaviorism rendered them objectionable
to those influenced by personalism who were helping form the new field of
the psychology of religion. Leading voices like Francis Strickland and
Gordon Allport argued for psychological models that preserved a role for
authentic choice and responsibility.
The initial reaction in the holiness wing of Wesleyanism to
suggestions of the role of the unconscious in human action was also
typically negative, worrying that this was simply an attempt to “explain
away” sinning. But continuing dialogue with modern psychology and its
emphasis on the nonrational dimensions of human motivation encouraged
moves in this wing to qualify the “spontaneous rational control” emphasis
of their model of Christian Perfection. The most common way of doing this
has been to invoke a distinction between purity and maturity that separates
the “carnal nature” that is instantaneously cleansed in entire sanctification
from repressed complexes and other psychological issues that must be dealt
with through long-term counseling. Whatever else one makes of this
distinction, it equates Christian Perfection with something quite different
from Wesley’s model of mature holy tempers formed by responsive
participation in the full range of the means of grace.
With their reductionist and determinist tendencies, Freudian
psychotherapy and experimental psychology pushed many of the traditional
issues of moral psychology out of bounds for psychological study, at least
in professional settings. The championing in the latter part of the twentieth 
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century of alternative “humanistic” schools of psychotherapy—with their
emphasis on restoring authentic freedom by healing distorted self-
perceptions—was a move to recover the central concern of moral
psychology. Many in the Wesleyan camp initially welcomed these
humanistic models as compatible with (if not an improvement upon!)
Christian and Wesleyan commitments. But further reflection has led them to
join other Christian interpreters in judging some of these models to be
unduly optimistic about primal human nature. Equally problematic for
Wesleyans is the recognition that the humanistic conception of therapy
tends to terminate at the juncture accepting one’s character flaws, lacking
Wesley’s emphasis on the possibility (through God’s gracious empowering)
of truly recovering holy character.
Transition to the Current Engagement
Anyone who works in the fields of psychology and psychotherapy
will know that the last couple of decades have witnessed a remarkable
proliferation of models and a number of moves to address inadequacies of
earlier trends. As in earlier generations, specialists observing these
developments with Wesleyan eyes have begun probing these new models
and emphases. Along with the expressions of concern, there have been
suggestions of some significant new areas of resonance.8 Many of these
suggestions are developed in the essays which follow.
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